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The question seems to me badly posed, for two reasons. It 
assumes that constitutional provisions "are" something-or-other, 
which can be laid against the metric by which we measure stupid-
ity. But, as that allusion to United States v. Butler suggests, it is 
no longer clear to many of us that constitutional provisions have 
such a quality. 
Consider for example someone who believes that the metric 
for stupidity is defined by the degree to which a policy advances 
the interests of some particular favored group. Perhaps at one 
time the First Amendment as then interpreted advanced those 
interests, because the major threats to the political program fa-
vored by that group came from government agents. The First 
Amendment was at that time not a stupid provision. 
As time passed, two things happened. (a) The group's polit-
ical program changed, so that now the main threats come from 
non-governmental actors. Even if nothing else occurs, the Hrst 
Amendment, now less important to the group than before, is 
"more stupid" than it used to be. Perhaps, though, it does not 
cross some threshold of stupidity if it is merely less important. 
(b) The prevailing interpretation of the Hrst Amendment 
changed, so that now it provides greater protection for the 
group's political adversaries than it did earlier. Now the First 
Amendment really might be the Constitution's most stupid pro-
vision, depending on how dramatic the changes in interpretation 
are. 
Is that the most helpful way to describe what has happened, 
though? I can certainly imagine someone taking the position 
that the Hrst Amendment, properly interpreted, is not stupid at 
all. For such a person, "the First Amendment" is just fine; the 
problems arise solely because it has been badly interpreted. 
In short, to identify any provision as stupid requires that one 
have a fairly strong theory of interpretation and interpretive er-
ror. It is not clear that such a theory is available. 
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Second, and for me more important, trying to locate a single 
provision as the most stupid may be misguided. At least I would 
like the opportunity to answer along these lines: "Most of Article 
I, much of Article II, a fair chunk of Article III, nearly all of 
Article VI, and many of the Amendments." It has occurred to 
me, though, that that answer is equivalent to: "Article V." 
My concern is that the basic structure of our national gov-
ernment may be unsuitable for contemporary society. This is 
only a concern, not a firm conclusion, and in what follows I sim-
ply want to indicate lines of thinking that might be productive. 
Consider the following propositions drawn from observa-
tions by political scientists interested in constitutional structures. 
Political systems with single member districts in which the candi-
date who receives a plurality of the vote wins, tend to have two-
party systems, while those with multimember districts and pro-
portional representation tend to have multi-party systems.! 
"Electoral laws that tum plurality preferences into legislative 
majorities are likely to be especially disastrous in highly divided 
societies."2 "[P]arliamentary democracies tend to increase the 
degrees of freedom that facilitate the momentous tasks of eco-
nomic and social restructuring facing new democracies as they 
simultaneously attempt to consolidate their democratic 
institutions. "3 
These observations suggest that the arguments for propor-
tional representation and a parliamentary system are stronger 
than many United States constitutionalists, brought up in a presi-
dential, plurality-winner system, think they are. Of course the 
particular historical circumstances of the United States may 
make those arguments unpersuasive. The United States is not a 
new democracy, for example, for which parliamentarism might 
be especially suitable. Social divisions in the United States may 
not be so severe as to require proportional representation as a 
partial solution. Two-party systems address social division by d~­
veloping coalitions within the parties rather than through multi-
party governing coalitions as in systems with proportional repre-
sentation; that solution might be appropriate to the degree to so-
cial division that exists in the United States. 
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The Constitution creates a presidential system. To some de-
gree it conduces to the adoption of plurality-winner electoral sys-
tems for Congress, and thereby to the development of a two-
party system. Creative constitutional interpretation and statu-
tory design might overcome these apparent obstacles to the 
adoption of an alternative regime.4 Nonetheless, the very weight 
of the existing electoral and political system may impede creative 
thinking about institutional, and therefore constitutional, design 
for the United States.s 
What is the source of this "weight"? Of course, to some ex-
tent, history itself, and the fact that the existing constitutional 
structures seem to many to be functioning reasonably well. An-
other source, though, might be the Constitution itself. 
The weight of existing structures would be less, though it 
would not disappear, if it were easier to amend the Constitution. 
Perhaps some degree of institutional stability is required for a 
system to warrant the name constitutional, which suggests that it 
should not be too easy to amend all of a constitution's provisions, 
or perhaps any of its basic institutional prescriptions. There may 
be room, however, between the desire to avoid creating an 
amendment process that is too easy to use, and sticking with the 
present strong super-majority requirements of Article V.6 
But, if the Constitution were amended to alter the super-
majority requirements for its own amendment, could the new 
process eliminate the equal representation of the states in the 
Senate? 
4. Nothing in the Constitution appears to require that members of the House of 
Representatives be elected from single-member districts rather than state-wide, for exam-
ple. Perhaps Congress has the power to prescribe multi-member districts and propor-
tional representation for the House of Representatives, pursuant to its power to "make 
... Regulations" for the "Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections," Art. I,§ 4. 
But it seems to me awfully difficult to figure out a way to devise a system of proportional 
representation in the Senate that is compatible with the requirements of (a} equal repre-
sentation of each state in the Senate, Art. I, § 3 (and Art. V}, and (b) the staggered 
elections for the Senate, Art. I, § 3. 
5. No one should have been surprised when politicians elected under a plurality-
winner system were uncomfortable with the scholarship of Lani Guinier, which argues for 
moves in the direction of proportional representation. 
6. Akhil Amar's suggestion that the existing Constitution accommodates a mecha-
nism for constitutional amendment outside of Article V indicates that, even here, it might 
not be proper to call Article V "stupid." Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: 
Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988). 
